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The current experiment was designed to assess the mnemonic consequences of false de-
nials and forced confabulations. Children (aged 6–8 and 10–12 years) and adults viewed
a video and then their memory and belief about the event were tested. Participants
were then divided into three groups. In the “cued recall” condition, participants were
asked to answer true- and false-event questions, but could choose not to respond if they
did not know the answer. In the “forced confabulation” group, participants received
the same set of questions, but were forced to answer all of them. In the “false denial”
group, participants were instructed to falsely deny in response to each question. One
week later, participants received a source memory test, and they had to provide mem-
ory and belief ratings once more. Forced confabulations resulted in false memories in
the youngest group. Moreover, our analyses showed that repeated false denials led chil-
dren and adults to be highly inclined to falsely deny that they had talked to the experi-
menter about certain presented details, when in fact they had done so. Furthermore,
false denial and non-believed memory rates were more pronounced in younger than
in older children and adults. Our results imply that denying experienced events is not
a good strategy in an interviewing setting, as it adversely affects memory statements
about the interview. Copyright # 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Scientiﬁc research into the fragility of memory has been dominated mainly by investiga-
tions into themechanisms underlying false recollections of events. This almost exclusive
emphasis on false memories has been catalyzed primarily by legal cases in which chil-
dren and adults may have falsely remembered being sexually abused (Goodman,
2006). Although much knowledge has been gained in experimentation surrounding
the phenomenon of false memories, research concerning the counterpart of false mem-
ories, false denials, is limited. That is, in many legal cases, children (and adults) some-
times falsely deny having been mistreated (Lyon, 2007). However, it is still unclear what
happens to memory when people falsely deny having experienced traumatic events. The
current experiment examines the effect of false denials on memory performance.
One reason for this imbalance between the empirical study of false memories and
false denials is that “errors of impunity” are regarded as less disastrous than miscar-
riages of justice (Forst, 2004). Nonetheless, especially because of societal concerns re-
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H. Otgaar et al.examine the cognitive consequences of false denials. Literature concerning the issue of
false denials can be broadly distinguished in two branches. In the ﬁrst research branch,
ﬁeld studies have concentrated on legal cases concerning child sexual abuse and in
which false denial rates were examined. In the second branch of research, experimental
studies have been conducted into the precise intricacies of false denials. We brieﬂy re-
view both of these topics next.
False Denials
The issue of false denials is intimately linked to the introduction of the child sexual
abuse accommodation syndrome (CSAAS; Summit, 1983), which was initially formu-
lated to explain the disclosure patterns of child sexual abuse victims (London, Bruck,
Ceci, & Shuman, 2005). Basically, CSAAS assumes that because of the nature of child
sexual abuse and the psychological dynamics surrounding the abuse (e.g., shame, fear
of the perpetrator), children frequently delay disclosing the abuse, deny the traumatic
event, and recant the experience. The CSAAS has, however, been the subject of much
criticism because it lacks a sound empirical basis (London, Bruck, Wright, & Ceci,
2008; but see Lyon, 2007).
Although the existence of CSAAS is controversial, research has demonstrated that
victims often delay disclosing abusive experiences. A vast number of studies has revealed
that victims have difﬁculties revealing a history of traumatic child sexual abuse experi-
ence (for a review, see Goodman-Brown, Edelstein, Goodman, Jones, & Gordon,
2003). Victims often limit the disclosure and delay reporting core parts of an abusive
event. What these studies have found is that victims of traumatic experiences often delay
disclosure for reasons such as being in fear of the perpetrator. More intriguingly for the
present experiment is the observation that a minority of victims deny that they have been
abused when in fact they were abused (e.g., Sjöberg & Lindblad, 2002).
The research does not paint a clear picture of whether false denials present a com-
mon phenomenon in child sexual abuse cases. The difﬁculty in ascertaining false denial
rates lies in the problem of obtaining substantiated child sexual abuse cases (see also
Lyon, 2007). In a study by Sjöberg and Lindblad (2002), for example, 10 children pro-
vided many descriptions of incidents of sexual abuse during interviews with the police.
Their descriptions were compared with videotapes made by the perpetrator. Four chil-
dren denied that certain sexual abuse acts had occurred. Although one might assume
that these negative answers referred to false denials, the authors acknowledged that for-
getting might have played a role in the response pattern of these children. Nonetheless,
the ﬁnding that almost half of the children denied all or part of having been abused in-
vites the possibility that false denials can occur in child sexual abuse cases.
London et al. (2008) showed that although false denials sometimes occur in child sex-
ual abuse cases, they do not seem to be that common among child sexual abuse victims.
They reviewed many studies containing cases in which children denied or recanted the
abuse and found that, although (false) denials do occur, they do so relatively infrequently
(<25%; see also Malloy, Lyon, & Quas, 2007). Whether such denials also represent ac-
tual false denials is often unclear because of a lack of evidence verifying the abusive inci-
dents. Although false denial rates could be low, it would be premature to assume they do
not merit study. Both false denials and false memories can exert devastating conse-
quences in the legal arena, with false denials potentially leading to perpetrators escaping
conviction and falsememories potentially resulting in imprisonment of innocent suspects.Copyright# 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law (2014)
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False denials and memoryExperimental Findings
When we examine experimental work relevant to false denials and memory, it is evident
that several psychological mechanisms could underlie false denials (e.g., memory, de-
ception, social inﬂuences). Although false memories rely on similar memory mecha-
nisms as true memories (e.g., Bernstein & Loftus, 2009; Otgaar, Verschuere, Meijer,
& van Oorsouw, 2012), it is not the case that false denials can be directly connected
to memory processes such as forgetting. Hence, in the psychological literature, there
are many phenomena intimately connected to false denials.
One area of research that matches the phenomenon of false denials has to do with the
production of omission errors (e.g., Otgaar, Candel, Smeets, & Merckelbach, 2010;
Wright, Loftus, & Hall, 2001). In such studies, participants witness or are involved in
an event and are then presented with suggestive information that certain details were
not present while in fact they were. The critical outcome in such studies is the rate of par-
ticipants failing to report details or events that were once experienced. In a study by
Otgaar et al. (2010), 4- and 9-year-olds had to remove three pieces of clothing from a pup-
pet. Half of the participants were presented with suggestive false evidence that they only
removed two pieces of clothing (omission group), whereas the other half was presented
with false evidence that they removed four pieces of clothing (false memory group). Dur-
ing three interviews separated by 1-week intervals, children were asked which pieces of
clothing they took off the puppet. At the ﬁrst interview, 45% (n=27) of the children omit-
ted having removed the third critical piece of clothing; this percentage dropped to 13%
(n=6) at the last interview. Both omissions and false memory rates declined signiﬁcantly
over time, but this decline was more pronounced for omission rates. Furthermore, false
memories were more likely to occur relative to omission errors at all interviews.
Another ﬁeld that bears a relation to false denials is that of memory silence, in which
people decide not to express a memory (Stone, Coman, Brown, Koppel, & Hirst,
2012). This area of investigation shows that people often remain silent about certain
memories, including, for example, childhood sexual abuse. Memory silence is an um-
brella term for a set of diverse memory phenomena. To give an example, retrieval-
induced forgetting (RIF) refers to the forgetting of related, but not-practiced events
(Anderson, Bjork, & Bjork, 1994). In a typical RIF experiment, participants have to
learn category–exemplar pairs (e.g., fruit–apple, fruit–banana, vegetable–broccoli,
vegetable–cucumber). In a second phase, they are instructed to practice retrieving half
of the exemplars from half of the categories (e.g., fruit–ap_). In a ﬁnal memory test,
participants are asked to recall all the words they can remember from the ﬁrst phase
while being presented with the category labels. The standard effect is that related items
that were not practiced are recalled at a lower rate than unrelated items that were also
not practiced (for a demonstration that silence leads to a facilitating effect on memory,
see Chan, 2009, 2010).
Another example related to memory silence is deception in which a person remem-
bers an event but withholds expressing it. Of interest, there is research showing that de-
ception, in the form of lying, affects memory performance. In research conducted by
Polage (2004), participants had to indicate the likelihood of certain events having hap-
pened to them before the age of 10 (e.g., hospitalization). After this, they had to con-
vince other people that these fabricated events had truly been experienced. One week
later, the participants were asked once more to rate the likelihood of these events having
happened to them. The chief ﬁnding was that after a week, participants were less likelyCopyright# 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law (2014)
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Polage referred to this as fabrication deﬂation.
Extending this line of work, certain types of false denials might also be caused by vic-
tims lying that nothing happened to them (e.g., about sexual abuse; Block et al., 2012;
Pickel, 2004). Indeed, recently, there has been an attempt to examine the mnemonic
effects of (deceptive) false denials. In a recent experiment (Vieira & Lane, 2013), par-
ticipants viewed several pictures (e.g., apple). Following this, participants were pre-
sented with labels of studied and unstudied pictures. Under each label, participants
received an instruction to repeatedly lie or tell the truth by describing the picture or
by denying that they witnessed the picture (i.e., studied truth–describe, studied lie–
deny, unstudied truth–deny, and unstudied lie–describe). Two days later, participants
received a source test in which they had to indicate if they studied the picture or not and
if they had to tell the truth or lie. Of most relevance for the current experiment are the
results concerning false denials. These led to relatively poor memory performance of
previously studied pictures, whereas participants had good memory for falsely describ-
ing unstudied pictures. So, according to this experiment, falsely denying experiences
adversely affects memory performance.
The Present Study
In the present experiment, we were interested in the mnemonic effects of false denials
from a developmental perspective. Although the paradigm of Vieira and Lane (2013) is
promising, in this experiment, we used a paradigm containing more control over the in-
structions to falsely deny. Furthermore, we used a paradigm with more ecologically
valid stimuli (e.g., videos) than the use of simple pictures. Taking these issues into ac-
count, we decided to modify the forced confabulation paradigm invented by Ackil and
Zaragoza (1998) into a method in which we could simultaneously study false denials
and false memories (i.e., using forced confabulations). From a practical angle, our
new method comes close to how interviewers often attempt to elicit statements from
children and adults. That is, in certain situations, interviewers are convinced that cer-
tain events might or might not have occurred, thereby pushing potential witnesses to
falsely confabulate or deny events (e.g., Kassin, Dror, & Kukucka, 2013).
In a standard forced confabulation experiment (Ackil & Zaragoza, 1998; Chrobak &
Zaragoza, 2013), participants are ﬁrst presented with a video (e.g., video of robbery).
Immediately after this presentation, participants are asked some questions about details
they had seen in the video. Participants assigned to the forced confabulation condition
are instructed to provide an answer to each question and, if they could not do so, to
guess. Of importance, some questions that are asked concern details that were not part
of the original video (e.g., “What kind of weapon did the culprit have?”). One week
later, participants are involved in a source memory test in which they are asked ques-
tions about the source of each item. Studies that have used this procedure have consis-
tently found that participants develop false memories for details that they had earlier
been forced to confabulate (e.g., Chrobak & Zaragoza, 2008; Hanba & Zaragoza,
2007; Memon, Zaragoza, Clifford, & Kidd, 2010).
In our new version, we modiﬁed the standard forced confabulation procedure by
including an extra condition to examine the ramiﬁcations of false denials onmemory per-
formance. Speciﬁcally, 6- to 8-year-olds, 10- to 12-year-olds, and adults were presented
with a video of a theft. These child age groups were selected because studies have revealedCopyright# 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law (2014)
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False denials and memorythat they differ signiﬁcantly in terms of false memory propensity (e.g., Brainerd, Reyna, &
Ceci, 2008; Howe, 2011) and because children from these ages are able to falsely deny
events and understand the linguistic concept behind denials (Cameron-Faulkner, Lieven,
& Theakston, 2007; Pea, 1980). After witnessing the video, participants’ memory and
belief for certain presented details in the video were queried. Then, participants were
divided into three groups and received several questions about details that were presented
(true-event questions) and not presented (false-event questions) during the video. In the
“cued recall” condition, participants were instructed to only answer questions to which
they knew the answer without guessing. In the “forced confabulation” condition, partic-
ipants were forced to answer all questions and had to guess if they did not know the
answer. In the “false denial” condition, participants had to deny witnessing any details
that were asked about during the questioning phase. One week later, participants were
presented with a sourcememory task, and their memory and beliefs about the details were
queried once more. In the source memory task, participants were asked if they talked
about a certain detail and if they saw this detail in the video.
In this novel paradigm, we measured participants’memory and belief for details that
were or were not presented. Our reasoning behind this was that one might expect that
false denials do not speciﬁcally target the memorial representation of an event, but af-
fect beliefs in the occurrence of the details. Recently, there has been increased scientiﬁc
interest in differences and commonalities between memory and belief. This is relevant
because in the memory ﬁeld, research mainly concentrates on believed memories.
However, recent studies have revealed that under certain conditions, people develop
non-believed memories, memories that are no longer believed to have occurred, al-
though vivid recollective characteristics still exist (Otgaar, Scoboria, & Mazzoni,
2014; Mazzoni, Scoboria, & Harvey, 2010). Non-believed memories are most likely
to occur when people receive social feedback suggesting that an event did not occur
(Otgaar, Scoboria, & Smeets, 2013; Scoboria, Boucher, & Mazzoni, in press). Trans-
lating this into the current experiment, our argument is that if our instruction to falsely
deny is related to social feedback, then false denials might lead to the formation of non-
believed memories in both children and adults (Otgaar et al., 2013).
Based on earlier work (Vieira & Lane, 2013), we hypothesized that false denials
might lead to worse memory performance for details related to the event. The reason-
ing behind this was twofold. First, false denials might lead to participants rehearsing de-
tails less often than in the cued recall or forced confabulation condition. Because
rehearsal strengthens long-term memory performance (e.g., Dark & Loftus, 1976), a
lack of rehearsal might perpetuate impoverished memories for facets of the event. Fur-
thermore, false denials might also lead to “no think” executive control mechanisms,
which might lead to a reduction of unwanted memories entering the consciousness
(Anderson & Green, 2001; McWilliams, Goodman, Lyons, Newton, & Avila-Mora,
2014). Secondly, false denials might affect source monitoring. The source monitoring
framework (SMF; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993) refers to the processes
needed to distinguish between authentic and fabricated accounts (e.g., lies, false mem-
ories). According to SMF, fabrications involve more cognitive operations (e.g., imagi-
nation) than true recollections. However, falsely denying details of an event might
actually result in memory representations containing fewer links to cognitive opera-
tions, leading to poor memory of details surrounding the event. This false denial effect
might, however, also be shown in another way. That is, although repeated false denials
might deteriorate memory performance of the video, it might also affect memoryCopyright# 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law (2014)
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memory representations, it might also negatively affect the memory of the interview
at Session 1. If true, then one might expect that false denials lead to participants falsely
denying that they talked about certain details to the interviewer. With respect to forced
confabulations, we expected to replicate earlier studies (e.g., Ackil & Zaragoza, 1998)
showing that forced confabulations lead to false memories in both children and adults.
Regarding developmental mnemonic effects of false denials and forced confabula-
tions, the following predictions were made. Because children’s source monitoring
abilities are less well-developed than those of adults, we expected false memories to
be more evident in children than in adults (Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Lindsay, Johnson, &
Kwon, 1991). Regarding false denials, we had a similar prediction. Because, overall,
children’s memory works less optimally than that of adults (e.g., Howe, 2011), false de-
nials might have more profound effects in children than in adults.METHOD
Participants
In the current study, 170 participants were tested (6- to 8-year-olds: n=58, mean
age=6.91, SD=0.78, 34 boys; 10- to 12-year-olds: n=55, mean age=10.98,
SD=0.73, 23 boys; adults: n=57, mean age=21.14, SD=2.65, three men). Participants
were primarily Caucasian. Children were recruited from primary schools in the Nether-
lands with parental consent. The children received a small present for their involvement
in the experiment. Adult participants were undergraduates from the Faculty of Psychol-
ogy and Neuroscience, Maastricht University. They received a credit point or a ﬁnancial
reimbursement for their participation. The experiment was approved by the standing
ethical committee of the Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University.
Design and Procedure
The current experiment employed a 3 (age: 6–8 years, 10–12 years, adults)×3 (condi-
tion: cued recall, forced confabulation, false denials) between-subjects design. Chil-
dren and adults were randomly assigned to the different conditions. Children were
tested in separate rooms at their elementary school, and adults were tested in laboratory
rooms at the psychology faculty.
The study was adapted from the forced confabulation paradigm developed by Ackil and
Zaragoza (1998) and involved two sessions separated by a 1-week interval. Participants ﬁrst
watched a video that has frequently been used in false memory research (Takarangi,
Parker, & Garry, 2006). In this 6-minute video, a tradesman (called Eric) enters an unoc-
cupied home to do some electrical jobs.During his stay, he steals various items. After view-
ing the video, participants received a short distractor task (playing Tetris) lasting for
5minutes. Then, participants’ baseline belief about and memory for details were mea-
sured. Speciﬁcally, participants were asked about nine items related to details presented
in the video (e.g., “Where did Eric ﬁnd the key?”), and they had to indicate their belief
(1=deﬁnitely not happened, 8=deﬁnitely happened) and memory (1=no memory at all
for the event, 8=clear and complete memory for the event) for these presented details.
These belief and memory baseline questions were derived from the AutobiographicalCopyright# 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law (2014)
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and Relyea (2004). The questions were asked in chronological order of the video. Follow-
ing this, participants received a 5-min distractor task (playing Bejeweled).
Finally, they received ﬁve open-ended questions about details that were presented
(i.e., true-event questions; these questions were already during the baseline questioning
phase) and three open-ended questions pertaining to false details (i.e., false-event
details; e.g., “What pet was present in the living room?”). Participants in the cued recall
groupwere instructed only to provide answers to questions that they were completely sure
about, and they were told not to guess. Participants assigned to the forced confabulation
condition were instructed to respond to each question and were forced to guess if they did
not know the answer. In the false denial condition, participants were instructed to deny in
response to each question (e.g., “The man did not steal anything”). Of importance, all
participants received the same true-event questions. For the false-event questions, we
constructed two versions. That is, each participant was coupled with a yoked partner
indicating that, for each pair, one partner received one version of false-event questions
and the other partner received the alternative version (e.g., one partner received the false
question: “On what body part did Eric bleed?,” whereas the other one received: “What
game console was in the house?”). The yoked procedure was included to ensure that
anymemorial consequences of forced confabulations were speciﬁcally due to confabulation
and not caused by a speciﬁc set of false-event questions (Ackil & Zaragoza, 1998).
The second session took place after 1week. A different experimenter questioned the
participants at Session 2. This was done to make sure that participants were not in-
clined to be consistent in their statements that they provided to the ﬁrst experimenter.
The second session started by informing the participants that the ﬁrst experimenter
made some mistakes by asking the false-event questions. Furthermore, they were told
that the purpose was to distinguish between true and false questions. After this, partic-
ipants received a source memory and belief test containing 15 source-monitoring items
each consisting of two yes/no questions concerning the source of each test phase – for
example, (a) “When you talked to [experimenter’s name], did you talk about a pet in
the living room?” (i.e., person questions); and (b) “When you watched the video, did
you see a pet in the living room?” (i.e., video questions). Then, participants had to pro-
vide memory and belief ratings once more. The 15 source memory items contained ﬁve
true-event questions asked in Session 1, four true-event questions not asked in Session
1, three false-event questions mentioned in Session 1, and three false-event questions
not mentioned in Session 1 (i.e., the yoked partner version). They were asked in a ﬁxed
order. Finally, participants were debriefed about the aim of this study.RESULTS
Baseline Scores
We ﬁrst checked whether any differences were present between age groups and condi-
tion on the total number of correct answers to the open-ended questions at Session 1. A
3 (age: 6–8 years, 10–12 years, adults)×3 (condition: cued recall, forced confabula-
tion, false denials) factorial ANOVA was conducted on the total number of correct an-
swers. No statistically signiﬁcant interaction [F(4, 161)=1.77, p=0.14, ŋ2partial = 0.04]
or condition effect [F(2, 161)=0.19, p=0.83, ŋ2partial = 0.002] emerged. We did ﬁnd aCopyright# 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law (2014)
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Bonferroni tests showing that adults (M=6.30, SD=1.61) had statistically more cor-
rect answers than the older (M=4.98, SD=1.38) and younger children (M=3.88,
SD=1.39; p <0.001). Older children were also statistically more correct than the
younger children (p <0.001).
Forced Confabulations
One of the key questions was to assess whether the forced confabulation manipulation
at Session 1 resulted in false memories at Session 2. We performed a 3 (age: 6–8 years,
10–12 years, adults) ×3 (condition: cued recall, forced confabulation, false denials)
factorial ANOVA on the mean total false memory scores of the video questions of the
source memory test at Session 2 (see earlier). As expected, our manipulation was suc-
cessful. A statistically signiﬁcant age×condition interaction was detected [F(4, 160)
=3.95, p=0.004, ŋ2partial = 0.09; one missing value]. Simple effects analyses revealed
the following: in the youngest child group, forced confabulations resulted in particu-
larly high levels of false memories. That is, statistically more 6- to 8-year-olds’ false
memories were detected in the forced confabulation group (M=1.67, SD=1.03) than
in the cued recall group (M=0.75, SD=0.72) or false denial group (M=0.95,
SD=1.00; p-values <0.01). The pattern was not evident in the other age groups
(p-values >0.05; see Figure 1).
We also examined whether the effects of forced confabulations spilled over to false-
event questions that were not asked during Session 1. No signiﬁcant effects emerged
(p-values>0.05). Furthermore, we tested the impact of forced confabulation on the total
number of false memories for the person questions (see earlier). We only found a statisti-
cally signiﬁcant effect of age [F(2, 160)=10.93, p <0.001, ŋ2partial =0.12; one missing
value], with the youngest child group (M=0.43, SD=0.77) falsely recollecting more of-
ten that they spoke to the experimenter about false details than the other age groups (older
children,M=0.09, SD=0.35; adults,M=0.04, SD=0.19, p-values <0.01).
False Denials
Our primary interest was to examine the mnemonic consequences of false denials on
memory performance. We ﬁrst examined whether falsely denying details might cause
participants to report that they did not talk about certain presented details when in fact0.5
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False denials and memorythey did (a false denial effect). Our analyses supported this. A 3 (age: 6–8 years, 10–12
years, adults)×3 (condition: cued recall, forced confabulation, false denials) factorial
ANOVA on the mean total number of false denials showed that repeated false denials
resulted in worse memory performance for the person questions on the source memory
test [F(2, 161)=3.50, p=0.03, ŋ2partial = 0.04, one missing value]. Intriguingly, we
found that in the false denial group, participants were more likely to falsely deny that
they talked to an experimenter about a presented detail (M=0.27, SD=0.59) than
was the case in the other groups (cued recall: M=0.05, SD=0.23; forced confabula-
tion: M=0.12, SD=0.38; see also Figure 2). Also, we found that 6- to 8-year-olds
(M=0.28, SD=0.59) had higher false denial rates than the older children (M=0.05,
SD=0.23) and adults (M=0.11, SD=0.37) [F(2, 160)=4.39, p=0.01, ŋ2partial = 0.05].
No signiﬁcant interaction was found [F(4, 160)=1.18, p=0.32, ŋ2partial = 0.03].
Of importance, this false denial effect for the person questions was only found for
true-event questions that were asked at Session 1. We did not ﬁnd a spillover effect
to true-event questions that were not mentioned at Session 1 [F(2, 160)=0.85,
p=0.43, ŋ2partial = 0.01]. The false denial effect was also absent for the video questions
asked [F(2, 160)=0.17, p=0.84, ŋ2partial = 0.002] and not asked [F(2, 160)=1.43,
p=0.24, ŋ2partial = 0.02] during Session 1. For the analysis of the person-not-asked ques-
tion and a new analysis of the video-not-asked questions, we found the following. Sta-
tistically higher false denial rates in the youngest child group (person questions,
M=0.69, SD=0.80; video questions, M=0.98, SD=0.81) relative to the older chil-
dren (person questions, M=0.24, SD=0.51; video questions, M=0.58, SD=0.69)
and adults (person questions, M=0.14, SD=0.40; video questions, M=0.50,
SD=0.73) were also found for person (true) questions not asked during Session 1
[F(2, 160)=13.15, p<0.001, ŋ2partial =0.14] and video questions not asked during Session
1 [F(2, 160)=6.57, p=0.002, ŋ2partial =0.08]. For the analysis of the video-not-asked
questions, all other effects were not signiﬁcant (all p-values >0.05).
Memory and Belief
We also examined memory and belief ratings (mean numbers) at Sessions 1 and 2 as a
function of age and condition. A 2 (time: Session 1 vs. Session 2)×3 (age: 6–8 years,
10–12 years, adults) ×3 (condition: cued recall, forced confabulation, false denials)
repeated-measures ANOVA with the ﬁrst factor referring to a within-subject variable
was conducted on thememory and belief ratings. For thememory ratings, we found a sta-0.3
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H. Otgaar et al.tistically signiﬁcant time×age interaction [F(2, 160)=28.87, p <0.001, ŋ2partial=0.27].
Simple effect analyses showed that only during Session 1 did adults (M=54.64,
SD=10.04) have statistically higher total memory scores than the older (M=47.93,
SD=9.89) and younger children (M=40.74, SD=11.56) [F(2, 166)=24.80,
p <0.001]. At Session 2, these differences were not signiﬁcant [F(2, 166)=1.79,
p=0.17]. All other effects were not statistically signiﬁcant.
For the belief ratings, the following pattern of results emerged. We also found a sta-
tistically signiﬁcant time×age interaction [F(2, 160)=15.98, p <0.001, ŋ2partial = 0.17].
When we conducted simple effect analyses, we again found that only for the ﬁrst ses-
sion, adults (M=55.59, SD=10.59) had statistically higher belief ratings than the older
children (M=47.89, SD=9.32) and younger children (M=43.26, SD=9.54) [F(2,
166)=22.79, p <0.001]. At Session 2, signiﬁcant age differences were not obtained
[F(2, 166)=0.44, p=0.65].
We were also interested in whether our procedure might have resulted in non-
believed memories. In line with previous research (Clark, Nash, Fincham, & Mazzoni,
2012), we classiﬁed ratings as non-believed memories only if the memory ratings were
at least two scale-points higher than the belief ratings. So, for example, if a participant
gave a memory rating of 6, indicating a strong recollection to having seen a pet in the
video, but also gave a belief rating of 4, referring to a moderate belief score, then this
was scored as a non-believed memory. A 2 (time: Session 1 vs. Session 2)×3 (age:
6–8 years, 10–12 years, adults) ×3 (condition: cued recall, forced confabulation, false
denials) repeated-measures ANOVA on the mean total number of non-believed mem-
ories was conducted. We only found a signiﬁcant time×age interaction [F(2, 160)
=15.98, p <0.001, ŋ2partial = 0.17]. Simple effects showed that only at Session 2, youn-
ger children (M=0.71, SD=0.99) had statistically higher non-believed memory rates
than older children (M=0.13, SD=0.39) and adults (M=0.16, SD=0.53) [F(2,
166)=12.60, p <0.001]. This was not signiﬁcant during the ﬁrst session [F(2, 166)
=1.40, p=0.25].
Of importance, during the second session, participants could develop non-believed
memories for the true- and false-event questions. Research shows that non-believed mem-
ories can be evoked for authentic and false experiences thereby resulting in nonbelieved true
and falsememories, respectively (Otgaar et al., 2014). A 2 (type: non-believed truememory
vs. non-believed false memory)×3 (age: 6–8 years, 10–12 years, adults)×3 (condition:
cued recall, forced confabulation, false denials) repeated-measures ANOVA was con-
ducted on rates of non-believed true and falsememories at the second session. A statistically
signiﬁcant main effect of type was obtained [F(1, 159)=4.51, p=0.04, ŋ2partial=0.03],
showing that non-believed true memories (M=0.22, SD=0.54) were more easily elicited
than non-believed false memories (M=0.12, SD=0.42). We also found that younger chil-
dren had statistically higher non-believed memory rates (M=0.71, SD=0.99) than the
older childrenM=0.13, SD=0.39) and adults (M=0.16, SD=0.53) [F(2, 159)=12.69,
p <0.001, ŋ2partial=0.14].
Exploratory Correlational Analysis
We also explored whether an increased susceptibility to false memories would go hand in
hand with or protect against the formation of false denials. Our correlational analysis only
found that participants with a false memory for the video questions were statistically less
likely to falsely deny details that were presented in the video (r=0.18, p=0.02).Copyright# 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law (2014)
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The primary aim of the current investigation was to examine the memorial ramiﬁca-
tions of false denials and forced confabulations in children and adults. Our main results
can be catalogued as follows. First, we found that forced confabulations made young
children falsely remember details that were not part of the video. Our most intriguing
result was that in the false denial group, both children and adults had an increased ten-
dency to falsely deny having talked with the experimenter about presented details. Also,
we found that in all groups, non-believed memories were more likely to occur in chil-
dren than in adults.
We also found that forced confabulations led to the production of false memories.
However, this false memory effect was most pronounced in the youngest age group.
This ﬁnding replicates earlier research by Ackil and Zaragoza (1998), showing that
the younger children were more prone to the contamination of forced confabulation
than older children and adults. This result ﬁts with an abundance of studies showing
that younger children are more susceptible to social and suggestive pressure than older
children and adults, and that this may lead to the creation of false memories (Loftus,
2005; Otgaar et al., 2010). In the current design, forcing participants to produce a con-
fabulated response may have acted as a type of self-constructed misinformation that
could have affected false memory formation.
The most novel ﬁnding of the current experiment concerns the mnemonic impact of
false denials. Our analyses showed that falsely denying that certain details were present
impacted correct memory performance. Speciﬁcally, we showed that in the false denial
group and for the person questions only, both children and adults were highly inclined
to falsely deny that they talked to the experimenter about certain presented details,
when in fact they did. In a sense, this effect parallels previous experiments revealing
that false denials resulted in worse memory performance (Vieira & Lane, 2013). One
might argue that this ﬁnding can be explained by source monitoring (Johnson et al.,
1993); that is, deceptive responses such as false denials might require few cognitive op-
erations, leading to impoverished memory representations of an event. In the current
experiment, this might mean that when participants had to repeatedly falsely deny de-
tails during the interview with the experimenter, their memory representation for the
interview became impoverished (Vieira & Lane, 2013). The net result could be that
participants are less likely to remember what they talked about during the interview
at the ﬁrst session.
Our false denial effect might also be linked to research showing that deceptive re-
sponses require more cognitive resources than truthful responses (Vrij, Fisher, Mann,
& Leal, 2006; Verschuere, Spruyt, Meijer, & Otgaar, 2011). Although speculative, de-
ceptive responses such as denials could encompass more cognitive load relative to de-
ception based on fabrication (e.g., forced confabulation). That is, in our current
experiment, participants had to inhibit a truthful reaction and also needed to falsely
deny that certain details were present. One likely consequence is that, because of the
increased cognitive load, fewer resources were available for the successful encoding
of the interview with the experimenter (Vrij et al., 2006). Hence, children and adults
were more likely to falsely deny that they discussed details with the experimenter.
A subsidiary aim of the present experiment was to examine whether false denials
might affect the production of non-believed memories. Our reasoning behind this
was that studies have revealed that social feedback catalyzes the formation of non-Copyright# 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Behav. Sci. Law (2014)
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the interview, participants received a form of social feedback to deny that they
witnessed several details. Our idea was that such denials might lead to the creation of
non-believed memories. However, we did not ﬁnd evidence for this. Non-believed
memory rates did not differ between the different groups. It might be that non-believed
memories are more likely to be produced when other people suggest to participants that
certain details did not occur, a procedure that parallels the research on omission errors
(Otgaar et al., 2010).
We did ﬁnd that non-believedmemories were more likely to occur in younger children
than in older children and adults. This ﬁndingmight arise as a consequence of differences
in memory performance between children and adults; that is, children’s memory works
less optimally than that of adults (e.g., Howe, 2011). It is possible, then, that children’s
beliefs about the occurrence of events are more malleable than those of adults, which
might lead to an increased probability to ﬁnd non-believedmemories in younger children.
However, developmental work in the area of non-believed memories is rather limited and
more research needs to be conducted on this topic (see also Otgaar et al., 2013).
From a practical perspective, our ﬁndings suggest that it would not be a good strat-
egy for child (and adult) victims of traumatic incidents to falsely deny that experiences
occurred. Take, for example, this stereotypical example. A child who is sexually abused
by a family member is interviewed about the traumatic experience by an interrogator.
The child, however, denies having been abused because of several external reasons
(e.g., being threatened, protecting family members; Goodman-Brown et al., 2003).
When the child is being interviewed on a second occasion, the child might not specif-
ically remember what he/she declared to the interviewer and might come up with in-
consistent answers. Such inconsistent answers might be regarded as a sign of low
credibility of the child, potentially leading to the assumption that the child is lying
(see Smeets, Candel, & Merckelbach, 2004). Of course, our experiment was not de-
signed to target the effect of false denials on traumatic experiences, but our results do
convincingly show that false denials adversely affect memory reports. So, when, for ex-
ample, child witnesses are interviewed in a correct manner about an experienced event,
talking about the event would be a better tactic than falsely denying or even keeping the
memory silent (Stone et al., 2012).
To summarize, our experiment has shown that forced confabulations lead to the cre-
ation of false memories. Of more interest, we found that participants were most likely to
falsely deny that they discussed several details with an experimenter when they were
instructed to deny experienced details a week before. Our experiment is the ﬁrst to
show the adverse effects of false denials on the reporting of information (but see
McWilliams et al., 2014). Our ﬁndings suggest that different deceptive responses
(i.e., forced confabulations vs. false denials) have different mnemonic consequences.
Thus, different types of lies exert differential effects on memory.ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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